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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HEBER W. GLENN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
RENA S. PLAYER, sometimes 
known as SERENA PLAYER, 
Defendant a.nd Respondent. 
Case No. 8780 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff commenced this action directing his 
remedy to the equitable side of the court and requested 
that a contract, which had been entered into over four-
teen years prior to the date of the filing of the complaint, 
be ordered specifically performed. The lower court justly 
refused to grant the request of the plaintiff and entered 
its judgment in favor of the defendant after a full trial 
on the merits. 
We do not wish to burden the Court with a lengthy 
recital of the facts, but opposing counsel has only recited 
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the record on controverted facts in the light most favor-
able to his case and has thereby ignored the oft-repeated 
rule that the judgment of the lower court will not be dis-
turbed if supported by any substantial evidence. 
On the 11th day of February, 1942, C. F. Player was 
the owner in fee of a parcel of real property located in 
Salt Lake County. (Ex. 8) C. F. Player, on the date afore-
said, was the husband of the defendant, Rena S. Player. 
O·n February 11, 1942, the defendant and her hus-
band entered into a sales contract with the plaintiff to sell 
to the plaintiff the real property which is the subject 
matter of this proceeding. (Ex. 3) This contract was 
written by the plaintiff's agent. (T 66) At that time the 
plaintiff paid to the defendant and her husband the agreed 
down payment of one-thousand dollars and, as recited 
in the contract, he agreed to pay six hundred dollars on 
May 11, 1942, and the balance on August 11, 1942. (Ex. 
3) At no time did the defendant or her now deceased 
husband receive the subsequent payments agreed to be 
paid by the plaintiff under the provisions of the contract. 
(T 47) And at no time prior to March 26, 1956, did the 
plaintiff, Mr. Glenn, contact the defendant to pay her for 
the p·roperty. (T 47) 
The contract recites that taxes would be pro-rated to 
the date of possession, but the defendant's deceased hus-
band during his life, or the defendant, have discharged 
the property tax obligation since the contract was entered 
into. (T 34) The plaintiff has at no time paid the 
property taxes (T 42) and he has never offered to reim-
burse the defendant for these taxes. (T 49) 
Shortly after the contract was signed, the plaintiff 
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removed approximately one hundred yards of gravel 
from the property. (T 37) The court has found from the 
record that the plaintiff relinquished possession on August 
11, 1942, and has not been in possession of the property, 
nor has he removed gravel, in any of the intervening four-
teen years. (T 73) It is well to note here also that for the 
fifteen year period between August 11, 1942, and the date 
of the trial, Mrs. Player's son has farmed the property and 
Mrs. Player or her deceased husband were at all times in 
possession by reason thereof. (T 57) 
As heretofore stated, the defendant's now deceased 
husband owned the subject property in fee during his life-
time. (Ex. 8) The only interest to the date of death of 
the husband, held by the defendant, was her inchoate 
statutory interest. (Ex. 8) She has taken title to the said 
property after electing to relinquish her statutory interest, 
through the testamentary provisions of her deceased hus.-
band's will which was probated in Salt Lake County. (Ex. 
8) The probate record was before the trial court in this 
matter, and that file disclosed, and the court here found, 
that Heber Glenn, the plaintiff, did not :file a claim for a 
refund or for a debt due in the probate proceeding nor did 
he request the court or the executrix to specifically per-
form the contract which is the subject of this case. (T 48-
73). 
In this regard, it is well to note, that the plaintiff 
waited until five years after the death of C. F. Player, the 
real owner of the property, to bring his action. By reason 
thereof, the defendant was placed at serious disadvantage 
to cope with the claims of the plaintiff. 
Exhibits 6 and 7 show that on March 19, 1953, de-
fendant entered into binding options to sell the said real 
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property to the State Road Commission. In addition, on 
March 9, 1956, the plaintiff, by warranty deed, conveyed 
a portion of the premises to Gibbons and Reed Company. 
(Ex. 8) 
The first notice of the plaintiff's claim during the 
fifteen year period which the defendant, Mrs. Player, re-
ceived was subsequent to the above conveyances and was 
in the form of a letter mailed March 28, 1956, written by 
opposing counsel to her directing her to make conveyance 
of the property. (Ex. 5 and T 47) This was fourteen 
years after the contract was signed-thirteen and a half 
years after the plaintiff was supposed to have made the 
final payment on the contract-five years after the death 
of C. F. Player-two and a half years after the estate of 
C. F. Player was closed-three years after the defendant 
was placed in an inextricable position through the options 
to the State Road Commission-and subsequent to the 
time the defendant had warranted a portion of said prem-
ises to a third party. 
It is also well to note that Mr. Glenn fully realized 
the substantial increase in value real property enjoyed 
during all of the fourteen years he was silent. (T 44) 
Some weight has been attached by counsel to the 
provision set forth in the contract of February 11, 1942, 
wherein Mr. Glenn was given an option to take title to a 
portion of the property after certain amounts were paid 
in. Significantly, this record is completely absent of any 
testimony or exhibit wherein Mr. Glenn attempted to 
exercise any such option. His only contact to the de-
fendant was by letter of March 28, 1956, in which his 
counsel requested a conveyance of the entire parcel. 
The plaintiff has set forth certain facts in a manner 
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which would lead one to believe are uncontroverted in the 
record. May we direct the Court's attention to Page 2 of 
plaintiff's Brief wherein the second full paragraph recites 
that the plaintiff offered the sellers the balance of the pur-
chase price on May 10, 1942. Transcript Page 47 shows 
that when the defendant, Mrs. Player, was asked if the 
plaintiff ever offered her the payments on the contract she 
replied t(N o, Sir." 
Again, the second full Paragraph on Page 3 recites 
that the plaintiff made other visits to settle the matter 
with the defendant. Her testimony, however, is to the 
effe.ct that she never saw the plaintiff after the contract 
was executed until the day of trial. (T 46-47) 
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Court properly 
refused the equitable remedy requested and entered judg-
ment in favor of the defendant. From this judgment, the 
plaintiff has appealed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT NO. I. 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM MAIN-
T AINING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE BY REASON 
OF HIS LACHES IN REQUESTING EQUITABLE RE-
LIEF. 
a. A Fourteen Year Delay In Bringing An Action In 
Equity Will Bar The Plaintiff From Receiving 
Equitable Relief. 
b. The Plaintiff Is Barred From Receiving Equitable 
Relief By Reason Of The Statute Of Limitations. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS ABANDONED, FORFEITED 
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AND RELINQUISHED HIS RIGHTS IN THE CON-
TRACT AND THE PROPERTY. 
POINT NO. III. 
THE PLAINTIFF WAIVED HIS RIGHTS UNDER 
THE CONTRACT BY NOT FILING A CLAIM OR 
DEMAND FOR PERFORMANCE IN THE PROBATE 
PROCEEDINGS OF C. F. PLAYER. 
POINT NO. IV. 
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A POR-
TION OF THE PROPERTY BECAUSE HE FAILED 
TO EXERCISE THE OPTION IN THE CONTRACT. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I. 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM MAINTAIN-
ING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE BY REASON OF HIS 
LACHES IN REQUESTING EQUITABLE RELIEF. 
a. A Fourteen Year Delay In Bringing An Action In 
Equity Will Bar The Plaintiff From Receiving 
Equitable Relief. 
The facts in this case, as found by the Court and as 
shown by the evidence, are to the effect that the plaintiff 
entered into the possession of the real property -we are here 
concerned with on February 11, 1942, and he remained 
in possession until August 11, 1942, upon which date he 
relinquished possession and was not seen by the defendant 
again until the morning of the trial of this action. The 
plaintiff demanded a deed be delivered to him in May, 
1942, but such a deed was not delivered at that time nor 
has one been delivered since. Substantial testimony was 
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elicited from Mrs. Player and LeRoy Player all to the 
effect that after the defendant relinquished possession of 
the premises, he was not seen again until the morning of 
the trial. 
The first word after 1942 that was received by the 
defendant which indicated plaintiff was asserting an in-
terest in the property was the letter sent by plaintiff's 
counsel to the defendant in the latter part of March, 1956. 
This was fourteen years subsequent to the execution of 
the contract and 13 Yz years after the defendant should 
have paid for the property and 13 Yz years after the plain-
tiff requested a deed. In other words, if plaintiff has ever 
had a cause of action, it arose 13 Yz years prior to his letter 
of March, 1956, and over fourteen years prior to the date 
upon which he :filed his complaint applying for equitable 
assistance. 
What has happened during this period of time? First, 
after the property was distributed to the defendant at the 
close of the probate of her husband's estate, she entered 
into two options with the State Road Commission, the 
first of which pertaining to eight acres of the property is 
probably enforceable either in an equitable proceeding or 
through an action for damages. Second, Mrs. Player 
has conveyed a portion of the premises by warranty deed 
to Gibbons and Reed Company. It is true that Gibbons 
and Reed have had notice of the claims of the plaintiff, 
but, nevertheless, damages would certainly be assessed 
against Mrs. Player if Gibbons and Reed were evicted by 
the plaintiff. 
Consequently, the climate here is such that the four-
teen year delay in enforcing any alleged right has worked 
to the serious prejudice of Mrs. Player, the defendant. 
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Such prejudice has arisen solely by Mr. Glenn's delay and 
must bear the label of ((laches" as against the plaintiff. 
In Dewitt vs. Old Town Bank, 85 Md. 315, 37 A. 266, 
60 Am. St. Rep. 322, laches was defined by Chief Judge 
McSherry, as follows: 
((Strictly speaking, and using the term as it is 
understood in the law, laches is such neglect or 
omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction 
with lapse of time more or less great, and other 
circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse 
party, operates as a bar in a .court of equity." 
Professor Pomeroy in Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 4, 
Sec. 1140, states: 
((Laches, in legal significance, is not more de-
lay, but delay that works a disadvantage to an-
other. So long as parties are in the same condition, 
it matters little whether one presses a right prompt-
ly or slowly, within limits allowed by law; but 
when, knowing his rights, he takes no step to en-
force them until the condition of the party, has, in 
good faith, beco1ne so changed that he cannot be 
restored to his former state, if the right be then 
enforced, delay beco1nes inequitable and operates 
as estoppel against the assertion of the right." 
The defendant's position here has been further pre-
judiced and impaired by other events which have occurred 
since the execution of the contract and which have been 
considered as significant to denying the relief of specific 
performance in other courts and by the text writers on 
the subject. For instance, C. F. Player, the primary seller 
and the person the plaintiff claims to have talked with, 
died five years prior to the time this action was commenced 
and nine years after the plaintiff requested a deed. 'Qte 
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prejudice which is worked by reason of the decease of 
C. F. Player is certainly subject to speculation but it is not 
difficult to imagine that Mr. Player, if alive, could shed 
much light on the facts in the case. By reason thereof, 
absence of his testimony would certainly make the imposi-
tion of an equitable order subject to great doubt. Further, 
the defendant, Mrs. Player, elected to take under the pro-
visions of her husband's will rather than under her statu-
tory widow's interest. How much her election was in-
fluenced by the long delay in asserting any rights by Mr. 
Glenn is again subject to some speculation, but it would 
appear reasonable to believe that the relinquishment and 
abandonment of the property and contract by Mr. Glenn 
entered into her decision to take under the terms of her 
husband's will. In regard to the foregoing, this Court, in 
Jones Mining Company vs. Cardiff Mining and Mill Com-
pany, 56 U 449, 191 Pacific 426, adopted the general doc-
trine stated in 19 R. S. C. 142, Page 3 9 5, which is as 
follows: 
((It is a familiar doctrine that, apart from any 
question of statutory limitation, courts of equity 
will discourage laches and delay in the en for cement 
of righ~ts. The general principle is that nothing can 
call forth the court of chancery into activity but 
conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence. 
Where those are wanting, the court is passive and 
does nothing. The doctrine is founded principally 
on the equity maxims, (he who seeks equity must 
do equity,' (he who comes into equity must come 
with .clean hands,' and (the laws serve the vigilant, 
and not those who sleep over their rights,' and is 
based on considerations of public policy. Its ob-
ject is in general to exact of the complainant fair 
dealing with his adversary, and the rule was adopted 
largely because after great length of time, from 
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death of parties, loss of papers, deatk ?f witnesses, 
change· of titles, intervention of equities, or other 
causes there is danger of doing injustice, and there 
can be no longer a safe determination of the con-
troversy." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Worthy of consideration is an additional fact support-
ing laches which developed during the long interval be-
tween the date of the contract and the date of the 
commencement of this action-that is the substantial in-
crease in market value of this property. It seems evident 
to us that a person should not be permitted to sit back 
comfortably on his alleged rights during a fourteen year 
period of advancing values without making any effort to 
occupy the property, pay taxes as they accrue or evidence 
any interest in the property, and then, when a profit is 
assured, solicit the assistance of an equitable tribunal to 
insure his gains. It was interesting for us to note that this 
Court, in a fact situation involving a price decline over a 
mere three year period, affirmed a finding of laches as a 
bar to equitable relief. See Olson vs. Gaddis Investment 
Co., et al., 85 U 430. 39 Pac. 2d 744. 
It therefore appears that specific performance was 
here properly denied. The plaintiff did nothing to enforce 
his rights after relinquishing his possession of the property 
for fourteen years. In the interim, C. F. Player died and 
the property passed through his estate to Mrs. Player, the 
defendant, who, thereafter, made options and conveyances 
which would, if upset now, expose her to lawsuits and 
damages completely out of proportion to any supposed 
benefits running to the plaintiff. 
Under these circumstances the laches of the plaintiff 
falls squarely within the above announced rules and the 
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plaintiff must be adjudged to be estopped from receiving 
the equitable remedy prayed for. 
b. The Plaintiff Is Barred From Re.ceiving Equitable 
Relief By Reason Of The Statute Of Limitations. 
The plaintiff requested a deed to the real property and 
relinquished possession of the premises during the year 
1942. It was therefore during the year 1942 that the 
plaintiff's cause of action accrued if he has ever possessed 
a cause of action. He waited until October, 1956, to file 
his complaint. The record is completely silent on any facts 
which would toll the running of the statute of limitations. 
Sections 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states 
that: 
uWithin six years: (after accrual of a cause 
of a.ction) 
* * * * * * * 
(2) An Action upon any contract, obligation 
or liability founded upon an instrument in writing 
____________________ " (must be commenced.) 
It seems superfluous to state that the plaintiff brought 
his action on a written contract; that his cause of action 
accrued in 1942; and that he has not brought his action 
within six years as the statute requires. 
It also seems superfluous to state that the statute is 
not limited in its application to matters arising at law but 
the general language also encompasses actions in equity. 
Although there appears to be no direct case on this subject 
in Utah, this Court's language in Smith vs. Smith, 77 U 60, 
291 Pac. 298, indicates this Court's acceptance of the ap-
plication of the statute to equitable matters. In an earlier 
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case, wherein the plaintiff was attempting, through equity, 
to impress a transaction with a trust, this Court stated: 
((There is therefore no question of an express 
trust in this case, and the statute of limitations is 
applicable here precisely as in any other fiduciary 
relations out of which constructive or implied 
trusts arise. In all such cases the statute begins to 
run from the time that the complaining party dis-
covered the wrongs complained of or when he was 
apprised of such facts and circumstances with re-
spect thereto as would put a person of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence upon inquiry. The law 
is stated to that effect by this court in the case of 
Gibson vs. Jensen, 48 Utah, 248, 158 Pac. 426, and 
in Salt Lake City vs. Investment Co., 43 Utah, 181, 
134 Pac. 603. If therefore the facts and circum-
stances which came to the knowledge of the plain-
tiff corporation were such as would have caused a 
person of ordinary prudence and intelligence to act, 
then it should have acted, and the statute of limita-
tions was set in motion as to it. This is so quite 
apart from the doctrine of laches which is always 
an important element in actions like the one at bar 
and which is relied on by defendants." 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Thompson vs. Rose-
hill Burial Park, et al, 60 Pac. 2d 756, in discussing the ap-
plication of the statute of limitations to an action for 
specific performance stated: 
ttThe action is of equitable cognizance, and 
the defendants have pleaded the statute of limita-
tions. The trial court held that the statute of 
limitations interposed by the defendants was ap-
plicable and rendered judgment for the defendant. 
Actions for specific performance of a contract to 
convey an interest in real estate, unless there is 
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fraud or unusual circumstances, would justify the 
suspense of the application of the statute of limita-
tions ________________________________ , must be brought within 
five years. See Wilson vs. Bombeck, 3 8 Oklahoma 
49 8, 13 4 Pac. 3 8 2 ; Hurst et al, vs. Hannah et al, 
207 Oklahoma 3, 229 Pac. 163." 
Kentucky has announced the same rule. See Knapp et 
J.l vs. Read, 21 S.W. 2nd 705. See also Church et al, vs. 
Winton et al, 46 Atlantic 363 and Pepper et al, vs. Truitt 
et. al., (CCA 1 0), 158 Federal 2d 250. 
It seems to us, therefore, the plaintiff's cause of action 
is directly barred by the statute of limitations. 
POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS ABANDONED, FORFEITED 
AND RELINQUISHED HIS RIGHTS IN THE CON-
TRACT AND THE PROPERTY. 
As found by the trial court, the plaintiff entered into 
possession of the property at the time the contract was 
executed in February of 1942. He immediately com-
menced the removal of gravel and remained in possession 
1 until the final payment was due on the contract. The 
trial court further found that in August, 1942, the plain-
tiff relinquished possession of the property and has not 
been in possession nor has he removed gravel since that 
date. 
On the other hand, the defendant, through her son, 
managed the property and farmed it each of the inter-
vening fourteen years. The possession of the property by 
the defendant during this entire period has been open and 
exclusive. 
These facts can lead to only one reasonable conclu-
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sion, that is, that the plaintiff in the year 1942 intended 
to abandon the property and in pursuance of this intent, 
relinquished possession of the property. In addition, he 
paid no payments for taxes or otherwise and remained 
indicatively silent for fourteen years. 
These facts are very clear and persuasive that the 
plaintiff abandoned the property and his rights in the 
contract. 
In Glatzer vs. Keyes, 125 Conn. 227, 5 A. 2d 1, the 
Connecticut Court made a scholarly summation of the rule 
of abandonment, and in so doing, stated: 
((To constitute an abandonment there must be 
an intention to abandon or relinquish accompanied 
by some act or omission to act by which such in-
tention is manifested. Stevens vs. Norfolk, 42 
Conn. 3 77, 3 8 4: Collins vs. Lewis, 111 Conn. 299, 
303, 149 A. 668; 1 C.J.S., Abandonment, p. 8, 
par. 3. While mere nonuse and lapse of time alone 
are not enough to constitute abandonment, they 
are competent evidence of an intent to abandon, 
and as such may be entitled to great weight when 
considered with any other circumstances, and 
abandonment may be inferred from circumstances, 
such as failure by acts or otherwise to assert any 
claim to the right alleged to have been abandoned, 
or may be presumed from long continued neglect 
New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. vs. Cella, supra, page 
522, 91 A. 972; Town of Derby vs. Alling, 40 
Conn, 41 0, 4 3 6; 1 Am. J ur. p. II ; Keane vs. Can-
no van, 21 Cal. 29I, 303, 82 Am. Dec. 738-. Most 
frequently, where abandonment has been held es-
tablished, there has been found present some af-
firma.tive act indicative of an intention to abandon, 
as in Peck vs. Lee, supra, page 377, 148 A. 133, 
where it was found that the mortgagee had de-
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stroyed the mortgage and the note which it secured, 
but nonuser, as of an easement, or oth,er negative 
or passive conduct nttay be sufficient to signify the 
requisite intention and justify a conclusion of aban-
donment. The weight and effect of such conduct 
depends not only upon its duration but also upon 
its character and the accompanying circumstances. 
Raritan Water-Power Co. vs. Veghte, 21 N.J. Eq. 
463, 480. McArthur vs. Morgan, 49 Conn, 347, 
3 SO, sustained a finding as a fact that a right to use 
water power of a stream in connection with a mill 
site, as to wbich there had been for eighl years no 
manifestation of an intent to utilize it, had been 
abandoned. See, also, Banks vs. Judah, 8 Conn. 
145, 161." (Emphasis supplied) 
Text writers have announced: 
((In the absence of a default of one party which 
gives the other party a right to elect to rescind, 
unless a land contract is voidable when made, for 
fraud, mistake, duress, undue influence, infancy, 
mental incompetency, etc., the same principle 
which requires the assent of both parties to the 
making of the .contract of sale ordinarily requires 
the assent of both parties to its change or extin-
guishment. It is, however, competent for the 
parties, as in case of other contracts, to change or 
extinguish a con tract of sale of real property by 
subsequent mutual assent. A mutual agreement 
to rescind may be found if, after breach or aban-
donment by one party, the other by word or act 
declares the contract rescinded. It has been said 
that no mode of terminating the equitable interest 
of the purchaser can be more perfect than a volun-
tary relinquishment by him of all rights under the 
contract, and a voluntary surrender of the posses-
sion to the vendor." See 55 Am. fur. P. 579. (Em-
phasis supplied) 
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In addition, this Court, in an action pertaining to the 
surrender of an option, has announced approval of the 
rule in 18 Am. and Bug. Enc. L. 362, which reads: 
((An actual and continued change of posses-
sion by the mutual consent of the parties will op-
erate as a surrender by operation of law, though 
there was no express agreement of the parties that 
it should so operate." See K. P. Mining Co. vs. 
Jacobsen, 32 U 115, 83 Pac. 728. 
Based upon the facts here found by the trial court, 
it is manifest that an abandonment has been executed and 
that by reason thereof, plaintiff has relinquished all of his 
rights in the property and the contract. 
POINT III. 
THE PLAINTIFF WAIVED HIS RIGHTS UNDER 
THE CONTRACT BY NOT FILING A CLAIM OR 
DEMAND FOR PERFORMANCE IN THE PROBATE 
PROCEEDING OF C. F. PLAYER. 
The fee owner of the real property in February, 1942, 
was C. F. Player, the now deceased husband of the de-
fendant. The defendant for the ensuing nine year period 
was not a joint tenant nor a tenant in common with C. F. 
Player and consequently had no direct affirmative interest 
in the property. Her only interest in the premises, as a 
matter of law, was her inchoate rights preserved to a widow 
under the provisions of the Utah Statutes. 
Therefore, in February, 1942, Mrs. Player was not in 
the ordinary sense, a seller, for her inchoate interest by the 
nature of things, was not capable of conveyance but only 
release. 
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That was all that she contracted to sell under the 
agreement of February 11, 1942, for that was all she pos-
sessed. This seems self evident if we could reflect for a 
moment on the nature of a proceding brought timely 
under these same facts. If C. F. Player was not made a 
party to an action brought during his life for specific per-
formance, and only Mrs. Player were joined, what relief 
could be obtained? Could the Court, under such circum-
stances, order Mrs. Player to convey? Obviously not. 
This distinction and the nature of the .estate held by Mrs. 
Player therefore comes into focus. She did not agree to 
convey the property-because she couldn't have-she 
didn't own it. Her husband was the person who owned 
the property and is the person who would have had to 
have made conveyance. Such was the status of the parties 
to the date of C. F. Player's death. 
Nine years after the date of the contract, in the pro-
bate proceeding, Mrs. Player elected to relinquish her 
statutory right and to take the property pursuant to the 
provisions of her husband's will. 
Pertinent sections of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
rovide as follows: 
Section 75-11-26: ((When a person, who is 
bound by contract in writing to convey any real 
estate or who is bound by contract in writing to 
assign, transfer or deliver any personal property, 
shares of capital stock, bonds or other choses in 
action, dies before making the conveyance, assign-
ment, transfer or delivery; and in ~11 cases when such 
decedent, if living, might be compelled to make 
such conveyance, assignment, transfer or delivery, 
the court may make a decree authorizing and di-
recting his executor or administrator to convey 
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such real estate or to assign, transfer, or deliver 
such persoanl ~roperty, shares of capital stock, 
bonds or other choses in action, to the person en-
titled thereto." 
Section 75-11-27: uon the presentation of a 
verified petition by any person claiming to be en-
titled to such conveyance, assignment, transfer or 
delivery from an executor or administrator, setting 
forth the facts upon which the claim is predicated, 
the court or clerk must appoint a time and place 
for hearing the petition, which shall be upon no-
tice." 
Section 75-11-29: ((If upon a hearing as here-
inbefore provided the right of the petitioner to 
have a specific performance of the contract is found 
to be doubtful, the court must dismiss the petition 
without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner, 
who may, at any time within six months thereafter, 
proceed by action to enforce specific performance 
thereof." (Emphasis supplied) 
The foregoing statutory procedure provides the ex-
clusive manner in which specific performance may be ob-
tained in instances where a promisor has died. See Free vs. 
Little, 31 U 449, 8 8 Pac. 407, P. 463. In the Free case, 
this Court appropriately said: 
((Appellants alleged in their answer, and it was 
admitted at the trial, that respondent presented no 
claim of any kind against the estate, nor did she in 
any way comply, or attempt to comply, with sec-
tions 3935 to 3940, Revised Statutes 1898, inclu-
sive. These sections contained special provisions 
in respect to action for specific performance against 
deceased persons. The writing in this case sought 
to be enforced falls squarely within the provisions 
of the sections above referred to. Waiving, there-
fore, the question as to whether a claim should have 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
been presented under sections 3 8 60 to 3 87 4, Revised 
Statutes 1898, which we think, in view of the pro-
visions of section 3 9 3 5 et seq., above referred to. 
Those latter sections are intended to meet the very 
difficulties which have arisen in this, .case .... " 
And in further explanation, it was announced: 
P. 466: ((Suppose it developed that specific 
performance should not be decreed, as is often the 
case upon a full hearing, but that the claimant 
had some right to damages, how are those damages 
to be adjusted out of the estate if it has been fully 
closed and final distribution has been made? If 
the claim stood merely as a legal one, in view that it 
never was presented as provided by law, it would 
be fully barred and no relief could be granted. 
Does it stand in a different light in equity un_der 
the provisions of sections 3935 to 3940, inclusive 
where no petition has ever been filed or claim made 
in the probate court? We think not. These sec-
tions, when we view and .consider them, have the 
same effect upon claims for specific performance 
in requiring such claims to be brought to the atten-
tion of the probate court pending the administra-
tion of the estate that the preceding sections, have 
upon other or purely legal claims. As to legal 
claims, the right is barred absolutely unless they 
are presented within the time fixed by these several 
sections unless the cause pointed out by the statute 
prevented presentation. This would be so whether 
the claims were matured or not, contingent or 
fixed. In claims for specific performance, we 
think, and so hold, that, unless a petition is filed or 
claim is made in a court for specific Performance 
within the time limited to file other claims, the 
claim for specific performance must be held to be 
waived or abandoned, unless, as in other cases, good 
cause is shown why it could not be· filed within the 
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time allowed for claims to be filed." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Here, it is not controverted that the plaintiff failed 
to file any claim against the estate of C. F. Player and that 
he also failed to file a petition for specific performance as 
required by the foregoing sections. There seems to be 
no question then that the relief requested would be denied 
as a matter of statute if this property had passed to third 
parties or if it were still held in the estate as an undistri-
buted asset or if it had passed to the defendant without 
her name appearing on the contract. 
An inspection of the decree entered on P. 24 of Ex. 
8 will disclose that claims against C. F. Player's estate were 
required to be filed on or before the 1st day of April, 1953, 
and that distribution of the assets of the estate thereafter 
took place on May 6, 1953. In addition, no petition for 
specific performance was ever interposed. Consequently, 
and we quote again the language of the Free Case: 
cc. • • the claim for specific performance must 
be waived or abandoned .... " 
It should be recognized in this regard that during 
probate, and considering that the decedent owned the 
fee interest in the property, the executrix of the estate 
held the entire interest in the property subject to the pro-
bate proceeding. It is of cardinal importance to note 
also that the interest of Mrs. Player only arose after she 
had made here election and only was perfected by way of 
and upon distribution. She took nothing which she pos· 
sessed and agreed to sell under the provisions of the con· 
tract of February, 1942. · 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
Consequently, the trial court, if it had ordered spe-
cific performance of the contract would have ordered Mrs. 
Player to convey something which she did not own and 
could not have conveyed in February, 1942, or at any 
time prior to distribution. Further, as a matter of statute 
and law, the plaintiff's rights were waived and abandoned 
by his failure to comply with the aforequoted statutory 
se.ctions. 
It necessarily follows that the result is not changed 
because Mrs. Player signed the original contract. 
POINT IV. 
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PO·R-
TIO·N OF THE PRO·PERTY BECAUSE HE FAILED 
TO EXERCISE THE OPTIO·N IN THE CONTRACT. 
The plaintiff argues under Point IV. of his brief that 
he is entitled to a portion of the premises because the con-
tract contained a covenant which provided that at his 
option he could acquire title to one of the two tracts in-
. volved after he had paid a certain sum. There is no ques-
tion that enough money was paid to enable the plaintiff 
, to exercise his option and a.cquire the smaller parcel, but 
: the mere existance of such an option does not compel the 
· conveyance. Certain acts must be done to perfect the 
., right such as notice of the election and request for the 
: deed and an entry as provided in the contract. 
It seems patently clear from this record that such an 
. election was never made and that any rights under the 
~covenant have been waived and abandoned in addition to 
~being barred by the statutes hereinabove set forth. Of 
further significance is the failure of the plaintiff to intro-
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duce one fact which would support a finding that the 
plaintiff had exercised the option. 
This point raised by the plaintiff lacks legal signifi-
cance in this review. 
CONCLUSION 
The cases cited by the respective parties in this pro-
ceeding do not appear to evidence any conflicting doc-
trines which could be urged to this Court. In fact, the 
general principles announced are quite uniform in the 
various jurisdictions. We believe the record in this case is 
substantial in support of the judgment of the lower Court. 
Equity jurisprudence has historically been vested in 
the sound discretion of the chancellor and, with his oppor-
tunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and the 
parties, their frankness and candor, he is better able to 
justly grant or refuse equitable relief. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the lower Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
C. PRESTON ALLEN and 
W. DOUGLAS ALLEN 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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